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Abstract
In many practical situations, we need to select a model based on the
data. It is, at present, practically a consensus that the traditional p-valuebased techniques for such selection often do not lead to adequate results.
One of the most widely used alternative model selection techniques is the
Minimum Bayes Factor (MBF) approach, in which a model is preferred
if the corresponding Bayes factor – the ratio of likelihoods corresponding
to this model and to the competing model – is sufficiently large for all
possible prior distributions. Based on the MBF values, we can decide
how strong is the evidence in support of the selected model: weak, strong,
very strong, or decisive. The corresponding strength levels are based on
a heuristic scale proposed by Harold Jeffreys, one of the pioneers of the
Bayes approach to statistics. In this paper, we propose a justification for
this scale.

1

Formulation of the Problem

Why Minimum Bayes Factor. In many practical situations, we have several possible models Mi of the corresponding phenomena, and we would like to
decide, based on the data D, which of these models is more adequate. To select
the most appropriate model, statistics textbooks used to recommend techniques
based on p-values. However, at present, it is practically a consensus in the statistics community that the use of p-values often results in misleading conclusions;
see, e.g., [3, 4, 7].
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To make a more adequate selection, it is important to take prior information
into account, i.e., to use Bayesian methods. It is reasonable to say that the
model M1 is more probable than the model M2 if the likelihood P (D | M1 ) of
getting the data D under the model M1 is larger than the likelihood P (D | M2 )
of getting the data D under the model M2 , i.e., if the Bayes factor
def

K =

P (D | M1 )
P (D | M2 )

exceeds 1. Of course, if the value is only slightly larger than 1, this difference
may be caused by the randomness of the corresponding data sample. So, in
reality, each of the two models can be more adequate. To make a definite
conclusion, we need to make sure that the Bayes factor is sufficiently large –
and the larger the factor K, the more confident we are that the model M1 is
indeed more adequate.
The numerical value of the Bayes factor K depends on the prior distribution π: K = K(π). In practice, we often do not have enough information to
select a single prior distribution. A more realistic description of the expert’s
prior knowledge is that we have a family F of possible prior distributions π. In
such a situation, we can conclude that the model M1 is more adequate than the
model M2 is the corresponding Bayes factor is sufficiently large for all possible
prior distributions π ∈ F , i.e., equivalently, that the Minimum Bayes Factor
def

MBF = min K(π)
π∈F

is sufficiently large; see, e.g., [4, 5].
Jeffreys scale. In practical applications of Minimum Bayes Factor, the following scale is usually used; this scale was originally proposed in [2]:
• when the value of MBF is between 1 and 3, we say that the evidence for
the model M1 is barely worth mentioning;
• when the value of MBF is between 3 and 10, we say that the evidence for
the model M1 is substantial;
• when the value of MBF is between 10 and 30, we say that the evidence
for the model M1 is strong;
• when the value of MBF is between 30 and 100, we say that the evidence
for the model M1 is very strong;
• finally, when the value of MBF is larger than 100, we say that the evidence
for the model M1 is decisive.
Remaining problem and what we do in this paper. Jeffrey’s scale has
been effectively used, so it seems to be adequate, but why? Why do we select,
e.g., 1 to 3 and not 1 to 2 and 1 to 5?
In this paper, we provide a possible explanation for the success of Jeffrey’s
scale. This explanation is based on a general explanation of the half-order-ofmagnitude scales provides in [1].
2
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Our Explanation

Towards the precise formulation of the problem. A scale means, crudely
speaking, that instead of considering all possible of the MBF, we consider discretely many values
. . . < x0 < x1 < x2 < . . .
corresponding to different leveles of strength. Every actual value x is then
approximated by one of these values xi ≈ x.
What is the probability distribution of the resulting approximation error
def
∆x = xi − x? This error is caused by many different factors. It is known that
under certain reasonable conditions, an error caused by many different factors
is distributed according to Gaussian (normal) distribution (see, e.g., [6]; this
result – called the Central Limit Theorem – is one of the reasons why Gaussian
distributions are ubiquitous). It is therefore reasonable to assume that ∆x is
normally distributed.
It is known that a normal distribution is uniquely determined by its two
parameters: its average µ and its standard deviation σ. For situations in which
the approximating value is xi , let us denote:
• the mean value of the approximation error ∆x by ∆i , and
• the standard deviation of the approximation error by σi .
Thus, when the approximate value is xi , the actual value x = xi − ∆x is distributed according to the Gaussian distribution, with the mean xi − ∆i (which
we will denote by x
ei ), and the standard deviation σi .
For a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ, the
probability density is everywhere positive, so theoretically, we can have values
which are as far away from the mean value µ as possible. In practice, however,
the probabilities of large deviations from µ are so small that the possibility
of such deviations can be safely ignored. For example, it is known that the
probability of having the value outside the “three sigma” interval [µ−3σ, µ+3σ]
is ≈ 0.1% and therefore, in most applications in science and engineering, it is
assumed that values outside this interval are impossible.
There are some applications where we cannot make this assumption. For
example, in designing computer chips, when we have millions of elements on
the chip, allowing 0.1% of these elements to malfunction would mean that at
any given time, thousands of elements malfunction and thus, the chip would
malfunction as well. For such critical applications, we want the probability of
deviation to be much smaller than 0.1%, e.g., ≤ 10−8 . Such small probabilities
(which practically exclude any possibility of an error) can be guaranteed if we
use a “six sigma” interval [µ − 6σ, µ + 6σ]. For this interval, the probability for
a normally distributed variable to be outside it is indeed ≈ 10−8 .
In accordance with the above idea, for each xi , if the actual value x is within
the “three sigma” range Ii = [e
xi − 3σi , x
ei + 3σi ], then it is reasonable to take
xi as the corresponding approximation.
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What should be the standard deviation σi of the approximation error? We
are talking about a very crude approximation, when, e.g., all the values from
1 to 3 are assigned the same level. Thus, the approximation error has to be
reasonably large. The only limitation on the approximation error is that we
want to make sure that all values that we are covering are indeed non-negative,
i.e., that for every i, even the extended “six sigma” interval [e
xi − 6σi , x
ei + 6σi ]
only contains non-negative values. Other than that, there should not be any
other limitations on the approximation error – i.e., the value σi should be the
largest for which the above property holds.
We want to cover all possible values x, so that each positive real number
x be covered by one of the intervals Ii . In other words, we want the union of
all these intervals to coincide with the set of all positive real numbers. We also
want to make sure that to each value x, we assign exactly one strength level, i.e.,
that the intervals Ii corresponding to different strength levels do not intersect
– except maybe at the borderline point.
Thus, we arrive at the following definitions.
Definition.
• We say that an interval I = [µ − 3σ, µ + 3σ] is reliably non-negative if
every real number from the interval [µ − 6σ, µ + 6σ] is non-negative.
• We say that an interval I = [µ − 3σ, µ + 3σ] is realistic if for the given
µ, the corresponding value σ is the largest for which the corresponding
interval is reliably non-negative.
• We say that a set of realistic intervals {Ii = [xi , xi ]} with
. . . ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ . . .
describes strength levels if S
these intervals form a partition of the set IR+ of
all positive real numbers: Ii = IR+ and for each i 6= j, the intersection
i

Ii ∩ Ij is either an empty set or a single point.
Proposition. A set of realistic intervals Ii = [xi , xi ] describes strength levels if
and only if these intervals have the form [xi , xi ] = [3i · x0 , 3i+1 · x0 ].
Discussion. In other words, we have intervals
[x0 , 3 · x0 ], [3 · x0 , 9 · x0 ], [9 · x0 , 27 · x0 ], . . .
This is (almost) what the Jeffreys scale recommends, with x0 = 1 – the only
difference is that in the Jeffreys scale, we have 10 instead of 9. Modulo this
minor issue, we indeed have an explanation for the empirical success of the
Jeffreys scale.
Proof of the Proposition. Each interval
Ii = [xi , xi ] = [µi − 3σi , µi + 3σi ]
4

is realistic. This means that when the value µi is fixed, the corresponding value
σi is the largest for which all the numbers from the intervals [µi − 6σi , µi + 6σi ]
are non-negative. One can easily see that this largest value corresponds to the
1
· µi . For this value σi , we have
case when µi − 6σi = 0, i.e., when σi =
6
1
3
xi = µi − 3σi = · µi and xi = µi + 3σi = · µi . Thus, for each realistic interval
2
2
Ii = [xi , xi ], we have xi = 3 · xi .
In particular, this is true for i = 0, so we have x0 = 3x0 , where we denoted
def
x0 = x0 . Let us prove, by induction, that for every i, we have xi = 3i · x0 and
xi = 3i+1 · x0 . Indeed, we have just proved these equalities for i = 0, i.e., we
have the induction base.
Let us now prove the induction step. Suppose that
Ii = [xi , xi ] = [3i · x0 , 3i+1 · x0 ].
The intervals Ii form a partition, so the next interval Ii+1 intersects with Ii at
exactly one point: xi+1 = xi = 3i+1 · x0 . Since the interval Ii+1 is realistic, we
have xi+1 = 3 · xi+1 = 3(i+1)+1 · x0 . The induction step is thus proven, and so
is the proposition.
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